SUMMARY
During the past decades, there has been a marked decrease in the risk, in particular the risk of death, associated with anaesthesia. The risk of death attributable to anaesthesia in the period [1948] [1949] [1950] [1951] [1952] was reported as 1 in 2680 [1] . More recently, however, the Confidential Enquiry into PeriOperative Deaths [2] reported only three deaths in 555 258 anaesthetics as solely attributable to anaesthetic misadventure-an incidence of 1 in 185 056. Similar reductions in anaesthetic mortality have been reported from the U.S.A. [3] and South Africa [4] . Nonetheless, anaesthesia is still associated with a significant morbidity [5, 6] , much of which is preventable [7] .
Most accidents and near accidents are caused by unsafe practices or working conditions [8] . The Reported Significant Observations study is an information gathering, quality assessment technique which uses participation of personnel to report unsafe practices and conditions in their working environment [9] . A significant observation is defined as any deviation, however minor, from accepted safe practice or working condition. We describe a prospective analysis of reported significant observations during anaesthesia, collected during an 18-month period in a teaching hospital in the Netherlands.
METHODS
In an initial pilot study we collected 100 reported significant observations over a 2-month period. The results of this pilot study were used to develop a standard reporting format and to develop a classification scheme. Data from the pilot study were not included in the final analysis.
All anaesthetists, trainee anaesthetists, anaesthetic nurses and recovery room staff in the University Hospital Leiden took part in the study. Extensive introductory sessions were held before the start of the study. Every effort was made to ensure anonymity in reporting, by the use of personal codes known only to individual participants and to one of the authors (V.C.).
All significant observations related to anaesthesia during a period of 18 months (from July 1989 to December 1990) were reported voluntarily using standard reporting forms (table I) .
Each report was evaluated individually, checked for accuracy and classified by one of the authors. The reports were classified into three mutually exclusive categories: human error (or procedural fault), equipment failure and complication. They were classified further into four groups according to the potential risk of the incident involved: No risk: An incident without any potential risk for the patient. Low risk: An incident which could have led to reversible damage to the patient. Medium risk: An incident which could have led to irreversible damage to the patient. High risk: A potentially fatal incident.
Data were analysed using a computerized data analysis program (Intelligent Safety Assistant, ISA version 1.10; Safety Science Group, Delft University of Technology, The Netherlands). 
RESULTS
During the study period, 549 significant observations were reported, of which 82 % were considered preventable. Twenty-seven percent of the reported incidents were considered to be high risk, 34% medium risk and 24% low risk. Fifteen percent involved no risk to the patients. The high risk incidents involved either administration of a hypoxic mixture to the patient or a major leak in the anaesthetic breathing circuit.
Only eight of the reported incidents resulted in a serious outcome for the patient (table II) . There were no deaths reported. Twenty-nine incidents led to minor outcomes (table III) and 512 of the incidents had no clinical consequences.
Human error was responsible for 411 incidents (75 %). Lack of vigilance or inattention and failure to check were the factors most frequently associated with human error (table IV) . Only 21 % of the reports involved equipment failures. The remaining 21 reports were classified as complications. The distribution of the reported significant observations involving human errors and equipment failures is shown in table V. Forty-five percent of all reports originated during the maintenance phase of anaesthesia ( fig. 1 ). Of these, 129 incidents (52%) occurred during the first 15 min after induction of anaesthesia.
DISCUSSION
This study was a prospective analysis of anonymously and voluntarily reported observations made by anaesthetists and other anaesthesia personnel. Any activity which was considered to be a deviation from accepted safe practice or working condition was reported. The conclusions are based on the classification of the data by one person, but classification was based on strictly defined criteria for human error, equipment failure and complication.
We found, in common with others, that the major cause of the reported incidents was human error. Craig and Wilson [10] and Cooper, Newbower and Kitz [6] reported that 65-70 % of misadventures and critical incidents associated with anaesthesia were caused by human error. In our study, the most common human errors involved errors in drug administration, airway management and ventilation. These have been identified elsewhere as the major contributing factors to anaesthesia-related cardiac arrests [7] . Most of the errors in drug administration involved picking up the wrong syringe, drawing up a drug from the wrong ampoule and inadvertent or relative overdosage. The most frequently reported factors associated with human errors were failure to perform a correct check and lack of vigilance or inattention. There is evidence that the use of checklists and improved awareness of the relevance of critical incidents can improve safety [11] . Routine and disciplined use of standard checklist procedures, as in aviation, should help to reduce the incidence of anaesthetic mishaps. Vigilance during anaesthesia, denned as a state of clinical awareness whereby dangerous conditions are anticipated or recognized and treated promptly, has been investigated and reviewed [12] [13] [14] . Sleep deprivation, noise and environmental pollution in the operating theatre and the number and method of presentation of monitored variables were identified as the most important factors.
It has been shown that fatigue adversely affects the professional performance of anaesthetists [15] . In our study, human errors were associated frequently with lack of sleep and fatigue. Our findings support the view that the working hours of anaesthetists should be regulated as is the case, for example, for airline pilots. Regulation of working hours for medical staff has been the accepted norm for several years in some Scandinavian countries.
In the present study, the majority of problems associated with ventilators resulted from human errors rather than equipment failures. Equipment failure is a relatively minor cause of anaesthetic mishaps. Cooper, Newbower and Kitz [6] reported that equipment failure accounted for only 11 % of all critical incidents and that only 4 % of the incidents with substantive negative outcomes involved equipment failure.
More than 50 % of the reported incidents during the maintenance phase of anaesthesia occurred within the first 15 min after induction. Increased work load and the presence of factors such as haste and distraction tend to increase the frequency of such incidents during this phase.
The role of critical incidents reporting in quality assurance in anaesthesia is now established [6] . The present study is prospective and has a much broader concept than previous critical incident studies [6, 16] . One of the major difficulties we encountered was maintaining adequate motivation of the participants. The frequency of reporting decreased with time. This was overcome largely by regular prompting and reminding the participants about the importance of reporting such incidents. Regular presentation of preliminary data and specific "interesting" case reports from the database acted as positive feedback and helped to improve motivation. Nonetheless, there are reasons to believe that not all significant observations during anaesthesia were reported during the period of study. It is possible that the majority of major observations were reported while many of the minor ones were not. A reasonable estimate of compliance rate for this type of study is about 50% [17] .
